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 Is the Taser a viable, valuable and preferred alternative to more traditional less lethal 
weapons by tactical teams during close quarter combat situations?  The Taser although 
surrounded in controversy is believed to be a viable alternative to the more traditional less lethal 
weapons found in use today.  It may be difficult for a team commander to gather the support or 
documentation needed to justify such a program, with the controversy, to a superior.  The 
research for this paper was on two levels.  The first level was to compare the Taser directly to the 
more traditional or perceived to be more traditional less lethal weapons in areas of effectiveness, 
deployment, cost, training and public controversy.  Secondly, using a multiple choice survey, 
tactical teams were asked about their experiences with the Taser compared to the other listed 
weaponry.  It was found that the Taser compares favorably in most categories, specifically 
effectiveness, deployment and training and was in line with other less lethal weapons in cost and 
controversy.  In fact, the effectiveness of the Taser is so far ahead of all the other weapons, that 
is was deemed worth the additional costs associated with implementation as well as the 





















 Law enforcement and specifically ‘tactical teams’ are often slow to change or deviate 
from established procedures and equipment.  Whether it is the fear of something new or concern 
for potential liability issues, change is often difficult for many.  Such has been the case with the 
use of the Taser by tactical teams involved in close-quarter combat situations.  Although much of 
law enforcement has seemed to accept the technology with fervor in recent times, tactical teams 
must prepare advanced training curriculum before the newer technology can be implemented.  
Associated with this training is the cost of manpower resources (overtime expense and time spent 
away from regular training) that occur when scheduling teams of officers as well as equipment 
(Tasers and cartridges) and materials (targets, handouts and other supplies) used during training.  
A tactical team must be convinced that the efforts and costs are justifiable. 
There are several questions that face tactical teams trying to decide whether or not to add 
Tasers to their inventory of less-lethal weapons.  For example, is the Taser a viable and valuable 
alternative to the more established, traditional less-lethal weapons?  It is believed that the Taser 
is superior to traditional less-lethal devices and weapons.  Is the Taser being used by tactical 
teams with success?  It is believed that tactical teams that are using the Taser are now choosing 
to do so in-lieu of traditional less-lethal weapons or devices.  Is the achieved success worth the 
additional expense?  It is believed that tactical teams that are using the Taser will maintain that 
the results are well worth the added expense of the unit, materials, training and implementation. 
 This study will begin with a description of the Taser and more common traditional less-
lethal weapons.  Included in this section are the traditional weapons found in most force 
continuums.  The research topic will begin with hands-on force on force, chemical agents, batons 
and other striking devices, beanbag and similar type projectiles, ending with the capture net.  The 
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costs, benefits and weaknesses associated with each weapon or device will be compared to that 
of the Taser.   
Tactical teams from across the nation will be polled as to their experiences with the Taser 
and how it compared to their use of more traditional weaponry.  It is believed that the poll will 
indicate that tactical teams that have adopted the use of the Taser will report favorable results.  
However, it is believed that the majority of the teams that respond will indicate that they have 
not yet incorporated the Taser as a primary less-lethal device. 
 It is believed that should these findings be proven, more tactical teams will begin the 
processes associated with purchase, training and implementation of the Taser as an alternative to 
more traditional (less-lethal) devices in close-quarter combat instances.  Subsequently, tactical 
teams would have a means of subduing combative suspects at close range with less opportunity 
for an incapacitating injury to the suspect or Officer.  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 Light mounted weapons were found as far back in history as on German rifles in World 
War II (Law, 1997).  We saw them again in the 70’s on the rifles of some high profile national 
terrorist groups such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) (Science, 2005).  A good idea?  
Absolutely.  However, it was not until the 1990’s when law enforcement and specifically tactical 
teams embraced the concept in a widespread fashion.  Thus, is the case with the Taser. 
 The technology and concept behind the Taser came out in 1974 by Jack Cover.  
According to the co-founder and president of Taser International Tom Smith, Mr. Cover was a 
fan of Victor Appleton’s Tom Swift series of books.  The word Taser originated from one of 
these books and stands for Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle (Gardner, 2004).  Rick and Tom 
Smith (brothers) teamed with Mr. Cover to refine the technology.  It was originally designed for 
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use by airline personnel to thwart hijackings, but has passed into use by law enforcement 
agencies as an alternative to… choke holds (Kornblum & Reddy, 1989, p. 434).  It is an 
effective, close-range weapon that does not depend on damage or destruction of tissue or organs 
to be effective (Kornblum & Reddy, 1989, p. 436).  In the 1990’s they developed the non-firearm 
version that uses nitrogen as the propellant rather than black powder (Taser, 2005). 
 The Taser, available today, utilizes a high-voltage, low-amperage electrical charge to 
disrupt the normal electrical, communication signals from the attacker’s brain (Harris, 2005).  
The voltage is passed through two small electrodes fired from and attached with thin wires to the 
device.  The described range of the Taser is a maximum of twenty-one (21) to thirty-five (35) 
feet.  However, the optimum range is listed as seven to ten feet (2000 Taser, 2000, p. 12). 
 Today’s Taser differs from the first generation stun guns due to the actual disruption of 
muscle control.  The original stun guns were more on the line of “cattle prods” that worked on 
pain compliance rather than muscle disruption.  Explained in an article in Taser (2003):   
Muscles, over-stimulated by the electrical energy, are stunned and the target usually capitulates under the discomfort of 
the stun effect.  These 7-Watt systems have had an effectiveness rating varying from 33% to 86%.  Highly motivated 
individuals or people under the influence of narcotics that numb the normal human pain-response mechanism can 
maintain an ability to fight through the effects of these first generation weapons. 
(p. 4) 
 In today’s Taser, the attacker is reportedly unable to control the movement of his muscles 
and may become confused, unbalanced and temporarily paralyzed (Harris, 2005).  Taser 
currently markets two units for regular law enforcement use, the M26 and X26 versions.  The 
X26 is the most recent upgraded version with a basic price of $799.95.  The M26 basic cost is 
$399.95.  The costs associated with the cartridges run from $16.97 for a standard cartridge used 
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in training to $21.97 for the enhanced clothing penetration version (Thomas, 2003).  There are 
additional costs associated with batteries, holsters and other accessory items. 
 The Taser requires training to properly deploy.  The training consists of familiarity with 
the weapon including proper loading, aiming and firing techniques.  Acceptable target areas are 
important for the safe operation.  Additional training concerning tactical deployment and 
immediate response to the suspect after deployment should be included.  Tactical teams would 
require advanced training as tactics would be tuned to match the newer capabilities.  Finally, 
policy and procedural guidelines should be implemented and reviewed. 
 Taser International suggests that potential users feel the effects of the device.  In fact, 
they require that all instructors experience it and master instructors must actually be shot with the 
probes and feel the full five-second effect for certification.  Using these guidelines, a department 
must comment considerable funding toward training and re-training of users considering the cost 
of replacement cartridges.  Most of Taser’s sales come from selling dart cartridges that reload the 
device (DeFalco, 2005).  Finally, there is the controversy surrounding not only the technology, 
but also the company itself.  In November 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
published a report stating; “Based on our study, we find that the many law enforcement agencies 
in the state have policies that can lead to the misuse of Taser.” (p. 3).   
 In an April 2005 press release, Amnesty International stated, “Taser related deaths in the 
United States and Canada have hit triple digits growing from 74 in November 2004 to 103.”  
They further conclude, “that there is widespread abuse of Tasers that, in some cases, constitutes 
ill-treatment and torture” (Amnesty International, 2005). 
 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) has publicly 
criticized local agencies throughout the nation such as a November, 2004 article in the Seattle 
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Post, Washington “We have a problem with the rush to tase and ask questions later, said Shelly 
Secreast, with the NAACP’s Seattle chapter (Le & Castro, 2004).  In Austin, the NAACP 
recognizes the positive twist that the use of the Taser should reduce instances of deadly force.  
However, they continued with “the NAACP has called for a moratorium on the weapon’s use” 
citing possible long-term effects (Smith, 2005). 
 The League of United Latin-American Citizens (LULAC) has also criticized the use of 
Tasers.  The Houston LULAC director Sylvia Gonzales states her concern, “It always seems that 
the minorities are the first to get a taste of something like this.”  (Smith, April 2005).  
Furthermore, there are government agencies also investigating Tasers.  The Department of 
Justice, as well as the Arizona Attorney General’s Office, are investigating the safety of the 
units.  During this time, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was investigating what 
Taser International described as “company statements regarding the safety” of the company’s 
products (Cusac, 2005). 
 In December of 2005, Taser International announced that they had received notice from 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission that the staff: 
 has completed the previously announced investigation into TASER International's 
disclosures concerning the medical safety of the TASER device; and certain accounting 
and disclosure issues.  The Staff further advised that it has determined that at the present 
time it will not recommend that the Commission institute any enforcement proceedings as 
to any of these matters. (Tuttle, 2005, n.p)   
 Other less lethal weapons have been the brunt of such criticism.  “Law enforcement and 
related industries faced similar problems with pepper spray deaths in the past, yet they weathered 
the storm with far less controversy.  What’s the difference?  Credibility” (Ijames, 2005).  
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Between obvious abuse by certain law enforcement officers and perceived irregularities in the 
way Taser International has conducted their business, the public’s confidence is slipping.  “Some 
[now] question our motives, intent and in some cases even our honesty” (Ijames, 2005). 
 High profile incidents that cast the law enforcement profession in a negative light have 
increased the public’s skepticism.  Those events, as well as in increased use of handheld video 
cameras by citizens have contributed to jurors holding law enforcement officers increasingly 
accountable for personal injuries, deaths and civil fights violations.  The trend of disbelieving the 
police also appears to have led to swifter and larger pretrial settlements (Hougland, Mesloh, & 
Henych, 2005, p. 26).  The issues of cost, training and on-going controversy are considerations 
for agencies as well as for tactical teams contemplating the technology.  The agency or tactical 
team must decide whether the benefits over more traditional less-lethal weapons are worth 
addressing these issues, possibly publicly. 
 An alternative to less-lethal devices in close-quarter situations is the use of force on 
force, hands-on or rushing techniques.  These techniques require the officer to physically touch, 
grab, knock down or tackle the suspect.  This places both officer and suspect at great risk of 
injury and further escalation of the situation.  Physical LTL [Less Than Lethal] force, which 
generally involved trying to wrestle the subject and sometimes relied on the element of surprise, 
tended to place police at the highest level of risk (Homant & Kennedy, 2000, p. 167).  Often, it 
takes a number of officers to effect the techniques.   
 To be effective, officers should train regularly in the various techniques.  Training posses 
additional safety concerns.  Training should eventually be conducted at full speed.  This can 
easily result in injury to the officers as well as the trainers or roll players.  Since there are no 
devices used in these techniques, the cost of training is minimal.  Once adequate safety 
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equipment such as pads, mats and various training aids such as videos and proper attire are 
acquired repetitive purchases would be based solely upon replacement needs. 
 There could be controversy when these techniques are used for a variety of reasons.  The 
sheer number of officers required for a speedy, effective resolve will appear to be excessive to 
the untrained, uninformed eye.  There will probably be injuries to both suspect and officers due 
to the amount of force required.  The suspect will be subjected to pain compliance.  The more the 
suspect resist, the greater the chance of injury to all.  Effectiveness is often based upon the 
physical and mental capabilities of the suspect.  One of high motivation or under the influence of 
a pain numbing controlled substance would be more apt to continue resistance when confronted 
with this technique. 
 The use of “holds” involving the neck area has been forbidden in many jurisdictions as 
the chance for severe injury or even death is great.  These “sleeper holds” would limit the supply 
of blood flow to the brain by compressing the carotid artery.  If used properly, the hold is 
effective and rapid.  Unfortunately, too many incidents of improper training or use have resulted 
in a choke hold rather than the carotid hold.  Stopping the ability to breathe is more likely to 
result is severe injury. 
 Chemical agents such as OC spray, CN and CS gas have long since been tools by both 
law enforcement and the military.  Chloroacetophenone (CN) gas and 
Orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS) gas have been around since the 1960’s and 1950’s 
respectfully.  Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) was developed in the 1980’s.  Oleoresin is the industrial 
extraction of the dried ripe fruits of capsicums (hot chili peppers) and contains a complex 
mixture of highly potent organic compounds (Zarc, 2005).  Pepper spray causes the 
inflammation of mucous membranes, resulting in immediate closing of the eyes, sneezing, 
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coughing, and burning sensation of the skin.  Its effects may last up to 60 minutes (Zarc-Vexor, 
2004).   
 Unlike the burning sensation and irritation to the respiratory systems as was experienced 
in the earlier versions of “tear gas”, OC spray reportedly produces the involuntary closing of the 
eyes.  While those with great determination or under the influence of narcotics may be able to 
withstand the pain associated with CN and CS, they should not be able to combat the effects of 
OC.  However, as many experienced law enforcement officers can attest, OC is not as effective 
as we would like.  External factors such as wind and rain can disperse the gas.  Eyeglasses, 
facemasks, hands and collars of clothing can divert the agent from reaching the face (Petty, 2004, 
p. 9). 
 Gas may be deployed by use of hand held aerosol, continuous discharge or blast 
dispersion grenades.  In addition, gas can be deployed using 37/38mm, 40mm and 12 gauge 
launchers (Federal Laboratories, 1999, pp. A-36-A37, B1-B11, B14-B22).  The use of chemical 
agents typically exposes the officers to at least a lesser contact.  Tactical teams may utilize gas 
masks that will reduce or eliminate the effects of the gas.  The use of such masks will obstruct 
the vision and can reduce communications.  The use of gas may contaminate the areas in which 
they are used.  The use of any of these devices allows and in some cases even suggests the 
Officer be beyond arms length during the deployment.  Chemical agents will require the suspect, 
potentially Officers and/or nearby citizens to decontaminate.  It may be simply facing a breeze 
and allowing the agent to dissipate, flushing with cold water or may even require medical 
treatment. 
 Handheld aerosol dispersion methods range from around $15 for the 3-ounce personal 
carry size to the larger 12-ounce for greater dispersements in both volume and distance for $44.  
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The hand tossed grenade is in the $35 range while the launched gas varies from 12 gauge rounds 
for around $5 to the 40mm liquid CS ferret round at $25.  The launchable rounds will also 
require a deployment devise at either a 12 gauge shotgun in the $250 range to a single shot 
37/38mm launcher at $499.95 to the 40mm multi-launcher at nearly $2200.  Beyond force on 
force and chemical devices, law enforcement has often used hand held impact weapons such as 
wood batons, ASP® baton, flashlights, PR-24 side-handled baton and Kubotans.   
 Like force on force, the use of these weapons requires the officer to be near arms length 
from the suspect.  The suspect is impacted with the weapon until compliance is achieved.  The 
techniques use pain as the motivator.  If a suspect is under the influence of a narcotic or mentally 
incapacitated the strikes may not be effective.  A suspect under this kind of condition could 
continue to resist or attack even with broken bones.  The cost of the equipment would range from 
less than $10 for a variety of Kubotans to over $60 for an ASP® baton.  The weapons are 
reusable and there are no regular reoccurring costs. 
 Training should be, but often is not recurring.  Many agencies will require initial training 
to discuss policy, strike points, liability issues and care of equipment.  However, few require 
training beyond the initial course or certification.  Like force on force, training is inexpensive.  
Beyond the initial safety equipment there are no reoccurring purchases associated with training 
baring damaged or worn items. 
 Another series of devices that will allow deployment from a distance is the use of 
beanbag, rubber pellet or ball, wood baton or other similar type rounds.  They are commonly 
referred to as specialty impact munitions.  This weaponry was engineered in the 1960s and 
described by Ijames (2005):  
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 Unprecedented urban violence caused Lyndon Johnson to create a blue ribbon 
commission to study crime, law enforcement, and the administration of justice in 
America.  One of the committee's most significant recommendations was for the 
development of non-lethal weapons, which lead to a variety of "less lethal" technology 
concepts including the TASER™, CN based Chemical Mace™, and extended range 
impact projectiles such as the "bean bag". (n.p.) 
 With few exceptions, these are fired from the same launching devices described in 
chemical agents/munitions.  Munitions such as the rubber pellet rounds, wood or rubber baton 
rounds and the rubber ball round may be used in a skip fire application.  A skip fire technique 
utilizes the projectile as pain compliance tool against the lower extremities of the target suspect.  
They can perform successfully from 1 yard to 50 yards.  Performance will vary depending on 
angles of deflection and surface material and density (e.g. grass vs. concrete) (Federal, 1999, p. 
C-12).  Ranges under 15 feet may not allow adequate distances for intended deflection (Federal, 
1999, p. C-12). 
 Most, however, are designed for direct fire applications.  In this application, a distance of 
less than ten (10) feet [requires] extreme caution due to the high possibility of a fatal outcome 
(Federal, 1999, p. C-12).  From ten (10) to twenty (20) feet, avoid the head, neck, spleen, liver 
and kidney areas.  At distances of twenty (20) to forty (40) feet, the target area should be center 
mass (Federal, 1999, p. C-12). 
 These munitions are designed to provide compliance through pain and blunt force.  Items 
such as the 12-gauge beanbag will provide up to 120 foot/pound of force.  The 40mm sponge 
round can provide up to 160 foot/pounds.  This has been described as being hit by a 95mph 
fastball.  The trauma should cause a suspect to fall, drop a weapon or generally become 
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compliant.  A subject may actually believe that they have been shot from the immense pain, flash 
and sound of the weapon being fired.  Shinder, Belotto & Sloman (1999) explain: 
 the mental attitude of the subject will determine whether [and how] they react to being 
hit.  [When a suspect attempting to commit suicide by being shot by police was] hit with 
the beanbag, [his] mental conditioning told [him he] had been shot, therefore [he] fell 
down. [He] didn't know it was beanbags [he'd] been hit with; [he] thought it was real 
ammo.  With our 2 other subjects [that were not effected by the beanbag round], they 
were fighters.  They had no intentions of being killed.  Therefore, when hit with the 
beanbag they just got mad and fought back. (n.p.) 
 Like the weapons before, someone with a high pain tolerance whether naturally or from 
consumed narcotics, well developed abdominal mussels, wearing of very thick clothing, obesity 
or as just described with the right mindset can resist the effects of these devices.  The use of 
these munitions has not been without their share of controversy.  While still in its infancy, the 
use of such devices was hindered when in 1971 a 14-year-old boy in New Mexico was killed 
from a shot to the chest (Ijames, 2005).  In 1997, the Ottawa-Carleton regional police agreed to 
stop using beanbag shotgun in late February [1997] after a man died shortly after being struck by 
one of the weapon’s projectiles (Blue Line, 1997). 
 The wood baton round is described as lethal from its use in April 1972, when Francis 
Rowntree, an 11-year old Catholic boy, was shot in the head by a British soldier at close range in 
Belfast.  The wooden round was soon replaced by a new development, which was commonly 
called the rubber bullet (Wikipedia, 2005). 
 The rubber bullet has also been linked to lethal results.  The instructions for firing the 
round indicated that it should be fired at the ground so as to ricochet into the target. When fired 
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directly, the round could, and did, cause serious injury. Seventeen people have died as a direct 
result of, or due to injuries sustained by, these rounds in Northern Ireland since 1969 (Wikipedia, 
2005).  Some types of rubber bullets used by police to restrain unruly protesters kill and maim 
too often to be considered a safe method of crowd control, new research concludes (Ross, 2002).  
An inmate who was left brain-dead after being shot with a rubber projectile by a prison guard 
died from his injuries, according to an autopsy report released yesterday (AP-Bakersfield, 2005). 
 Training is critical to the successful operation.  The officer must avoid the critical areas 
of the body such as head, neck, spleen, liver and kidney.  To be proficient, there must be 
recurring training and qualification.  The costs of the rounds vary from around $6 for the 12-
gauge beanbag to $25 for a 40mm blue sponge impact round.  The 40mm training rounds are 
around $20 each. 
 Along with the less widely accepted forms of less-lethal munitions include the use of 
water cannons, sticky foam and the capture net.  Water cannons are used primarily to disperse 
large crowds.  Mounted on a vehicle, there must be ample available water supply for the 
effective use of this instrument.  The force of the water will drive suspects away from the area.  
The duration and effective distance is short.  It is an effective weapon, but expensive and not 
very mobile.  It is used most frequently for trio control (Kornblum & Reddy, June 3, 1989, p. 
435).  Sticky foam is delivered from a specially developed dispenser that is carried in a shoulder 
sling.  When fired, it ejects the sticky foam form the dispenser’s cylinder (Zarc-Sticky 2004).  
This can easily become lethal should the foam be sprayed in the subject’s face causing 
suffocation.  Although the foam is non-toxic, the solvents that unstuck the subject are potentially 
toxic and so far not totally safe and effective solvent has been found (Zarc-Sticky 2004).   
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 The Capture Net can be deployed from its single use, one-shot launcher or by using a 
37mm launcher.  The Net advertises a thirty (30) foot range.  From zero to five (5) feet is blunt 
force.  Once deployed the net surrounds a suspect who becomes entangled.  The officer or 
officers then must physically restrain the suspect using traditional techniques (ALS).  Foster-
Miller Inc. of Waltham, MA is reportedly developing a variety of non-lethal nets that can be 
hand-deployed or fired from 37mm grenade launchers.  The anti-personnel system [originally 
consisted] of three versions: Sticky Net, a net containing a nontoxic adhesive coating making 
escape nearly impossible; Snare Net, a personnel entanglement net; and Sting Net, which 
employs a high-voltage pulse generator to quickly immobilize armed combatants and other 
highly dangerous individuals (Hausman, 2003).  Only the Snare Net version appears to be still 
available at the time of this paper.  In 1995, Foster-Miller, Inc was awarded a grant for almost 
$200,000 for the development of the “snare net.”  According to NIJ (1995): 
 a nonlethal net deployment module will be developed to enhance the safety and 
practicality of an existing projectile-delivered antipersonnel snare net system.  The net 
is designed to entangle and incapacitate fleeing offenders or in a standoff situation 
those armed with a hand-held weapon (not a gun). (n.p.) 
 There is limited documentation on the use of capture nets.  In a recent email, Sergeant 
Paul Wassill of the Durham Regional Police Service of Ontario, Canada sites several areas of 
concern from his experience with this apparatus.  These include the limited range - 15 feet, the 
weighted projectiles that carried the net were unreliable and could cause serious injury should 
they strike the suspect, could not be quickly reloaded, could not be deployed effectively indoors 
or in confined spaces and finally, the suspect could easily remain combative and in possession of 
a weapon even if entangled in the net (Wassill, 2005).   
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 Training not only in the operation of the weapon, but in the actions of Officers after a 
successful deployment would be required.  Training should also include tactics to be used to 
extract the suspect from the net and/or disarming while maintaining control.  Training in these 
tactics would be difficult to simulate.  The cost of the units range from around $50 for the 37mm 
version to $90 for the single use launcher (Kirchofer, 1999). 
METHODOLOGY 
 The question to be addressed in this paper is if the Taser is a viable, valuable and 
preferred alternative to more traditional (less lethal) devices that are probably already in the 
inventory of tactical teams during close quarter combat.  It is believed that the Taser is a superior 
tool and technique to the more traditional less lethal weapons.  It is further believed that the 
Taser compares favorably to the other mentioned tools on a variety of levels.  The first task of 
this research will be to acquire information on the more traditional weapons.  Sources will 
include the author’s personal experience as well as a review of published accounts, technical 
manuals, vendors and the Internet. 
 A survey will be sent to 1200 members of the FBI’s National Academy Association.  
This survey will be sent via email through an address established by the Association for that 
purpose.  Membership in this association is restricted to those attending the FBI’s National 
Academy in Quantico, VA.  Attendees are typically leaders and managers of state and local 
police, sheriffs' departments, military police organizations, and federal law enforcement 
agencies.  Participation is by invitation only, though a nomination process.  Participants are 
drawn from every state in the union, from U.S. territories, and from over 150 foreign nations 
(FBI).  As stated, membership has no geographic limitations.  They represent departments of all 
sizes and democratic classes.   
 16
 The multiple choice survey will have the respondent pick from comparable factors such 
as the size of the Department and tactical team, current less lethal munitions in use and their 
experience and other issues with the Taser.  The survey will be sent on two occasions to 
maximize the response.  Another request for information will be sent later in the program to 
address issues involving the capture net.  There is very little documentation available through 
normal media resources on this topic.  The survey results will be compiled into three categories 
representing the three agency sizes listed on the survey; small 1-50, medium 51-150 and large 
>150.  The survey results will be calculated via an Excel worksheet to demonstrate either support 
or to challenge the hypothesis. 
FINDINGS 
 From the initial surveys distributed, there were 73 responses or a return rate of 6.08%.   
The returns adequately represented the departments in size.  Approximately 40% each medium 
and large departments and slightly more than 20% smaller departments were represented.  In 
addition, it was not only Departments using Tasers that responded.  More than 35% surveyed 
respondents reported that they were not using Tasers and over 6% did not have tactical teams in 
place.  This provides a broad aspect on this topic.  The request sent later in the program (to 
address issues involving the capture net) produced only six responses with only two having 
experience.  This is a minuscule .005% response.  However, this did serve to confirm the belief 
that using a Taser is not a commonly accepted alternative. 
The chart illustrated below will compare the Taser with the more perceived traditional 
less lethal weapons.  The comparison was made on several levels.  First and foremost is 
reliability to perform.  Not the individual weapon, but the technology behind that weapon.  The 
chart assumes that the weapon has been properly deployed in each case.  In each case all things 
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are assumed equal.  The method of deployment, costs, training aspects and perceived controversy 
surrounding each weapon were also compared.  The purpose was to determine if the capabilities 
of the Taser were worth the perceived additional cost and acceptance of the public controversy. 
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 Judging reliability of the less lethal weapons requires focus on the technology 
surrounding the deployment and intended outcome.  The Taser’s technology is based upon the 
electrical impulses disrupting the body’s ability to control muscle function.  It should work 
regardless of the suspect’s physical abilities, mental motivation or capacity.  It should work 
regardless of environmental conditions, number of immediately available officers or possible 
surrounding obstructions or impediments.  The range varies from an impact weapon to 35 feet.  
The Taser is definitely considered a close quarter combat weapon. 
 Force on force is only effective if there is enough manpower to assure its effectiveness.  
Each situation would be different.  Perhaps one officer is enough and perhaps five officers are 
not.  Force on force is dependent upon either physical overpowering or pain compliance of the 
suspect.  Obviously a close quarter combat weapon or technique. 
 Chemical agents are not effective on all suspects.  Most chemical agents rely upon pain 
compliance.  The spray should cause pain to the eyes, nose, throat and contacted skin.  It should 
produce copious amounts of tearing and involuntary closing of the eyes.  However, those highly 
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motivated or under the influence may easily disregard the effects of chemical agents and 
continue to actively resist or ignore commands.  In addition, the deployment of chemical agents 
may be hindered due to weather conditions such has heavy wind or rain or if the suspect were 
wearing eyeglasses, a mask or even a towel over the face.  The suspect could even reduce the 
effects by deflecting the spray with hands or other obstacle.  There is the additional time 
involved in decontamination of the suspect.  Spraying within less than 3 feet os discouraged as 
damage to the eyes may occur.  Most sprays have a maximum range of around 6 feet.  This is 
considered a close quarter combat weapon. 
 Impact weapons, both handheld and launched typically rely upon pain compliance.  A 
few will also inflict blunt force that should be a deterrent to resisting suspects.  Like chemical 
agents, those highly motivated or under the influence may easily disregard the effects of 
chemical agents and continue to actively resist or ignore commands.  The handheld version 
requires the Officer to be almost within arms length.  Those of strong physical conditioning 
and/or martial arts training are more likely to repel the advancement of officers attempting to 
deploy handheld weapons.  Handheld impact weapons are obviously close quarter combat 
weapons.  The use of 12 gauge and launched versions is discouraged within 10 feet of the 
suspect.  It would not be a recommended procedure for a close quarter combat situation. 
 The capture net is designed to stop a suspect by wrapping them in the deployed net.  It 
assumes that once entangled, the suspect will capitulate.  However, a suspect that does not 
surrender will force the officers to use another described less lethal weapon or technique to not 
only take the suspect into custody, but remove them from the net as well.  The net lists a range of 
30’ and states that from 0’-5’ it is a “blunt force” weapon.  As advertised, it could be considered 
a close quarter combat device.    
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 The Taser stands out as the most effective or reliable alternative in close quarter combat 
situations with a reported near 100% efficiency rating.  There is less outside influences on the 
successful operation.  It should be effective regardless of the mental or physical condition of the 
suspect.  It should be effective regardless of the number of immediately available officers.  And, 
it is less likely to cause lasting injury and has no decontamination requirement.  The Los Angeles 
Police Department reports in those instances in which it did not work, several reasons can be 
advanced, the most important one probably being poor contact between the barb and the target.  
Also, the charge delivered to the target can be below the level required to freeze the subject 
because the batteries have run down or there is some other electrical problem (Kornblum & 
Reddy, June 3, 1989, p. 438).   
 The Taser is deployed using one of two currently available devices.  The first is a 
duplicate of the very familiar Glock handgun.  The second is a smaller version that is still based 
upon the techniques used to fire a handgun.  Both versions activate a laser targeting light when 
the safety is removed to assist in target acquisition.  The officer simply puts the laser on target 
and pulls the trigger.  The weapon will fire the darts and activates the electrical charge for five 
seconds.  The officer can reactivate the electrical charge by pulling the trigger again if necessary.  
Reloading is quickly accomplished with the removal and replacement of a cartridge on the end of 
the weapon. 
 Force on force and handheld impact weapons deployment is based upon the amount of 
force being confronted.  The amount and duration of the force is dependent upon the number, 
training and physical and mental conditioning of the officers.  The handheld chemical agent is 
dispersed through a small canister that is familiar with most modern day law enforcement 
officers.  The officer holds the canister at arms length pointing toward the suspect while 
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depresses the triggering mechanism.  Targeting is established by moving the canister while firing 
to assure contact in the facial region.  The officer can depress the triggering mechanism as long 
as the canister contains the propellant.   
 The launched versions of gas and impact weapons will require the use of a shotgun or 
37/38mm or 40mm launcher.  These are typically shoulder-fired weapons.  The gas is designed 
for firing through walls, windows or doors or when a more distance shot is necessary.  The 
impact weapons are designed for direct or indirect fire at the suspect or suspects.  Reloading is 
easily accomplished and the necessity of secondary firings is anticipated. 
 The capture net is deployed using a single shot, preloaded, non-reloadable weapon or 
through a 37mm launcher.  The 37mm version is reloadable and a secondary firing would only 
be necessary should the initial munition fail. 
 Force on force and handheld impact weapons followed by handheld chemical agents are 
the easiest to deploy.  Again, this is assuming that the officers are proficient in the use of these 
tactics.  There is no reloading effort or need to carry additional equipment or rounds.  Force can 
easily be increased should the threat increase.  The Taser does seem to be the leader in the 
weapons that require a triggering mechanism.  Although chemical agents do not require 
reloading to continue operation, the Taser’s targeting mechanism is far superior thereby reducing 
the need for reloading.   
 The cost of the Taser varies from $399 to $799 depending on which current version is 
purchased.  The cost of firing the weapon ranges from approximately $17 for a training round to 
$22 for the extra long probes used against thick cold weather clothing.  Force on force costs is 
minimal for deployment.  There are more likely costs associated with medical treatment and time 
off due to injuries. 
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 Handheld chemical agents are inexpensive as well.  Prices Range from $15 for a small 
multi-use canister that could be worn on a duty belt to $44 for the larger 12oz size used by 
Tactical Teams and riot control officers.  Handheld impact weapons have a minimal initial cost.  
An inexpensive Kubotan should cost less than $10 to over $60 for an ASP® baton.  Other than 
damage replacement there is no recurring cost. 
 Launched chemical agents and impact weapons begin with the cost of the launching 
device.  A shotgun would cost around $250 while a 37mm single shot launcher could cost as 
much as $499.  A 40mm multi-launcher capable of firing up to six rounds before reloading could 
cost as much as $2200.  The cost of rounds begins around $5 for a shotgun round to $25 for a 
40mm round.  The capture net has two currently available versions.  The single shot, non-
reloadable version is $90 apiece.  There is also a 37mm version for approximately $60 per round, 
plus the cost associated with the purchase of the launcher as previously described. 
 Like deployment, force on force and hand held impact weapons have minimal costs 
associated.  Next are handheld chemical agents that will allow multiple deployments on single 
canisters.  Shotgun deployed rounds are less expensive than the Taser in both initial equipment 
purchase and “per use” cost.  The cost of the Taser is in line with the cost associated with 
37/38mm and 40mm launchers.  The cost of “per use” is also in line with chemical agents and 
impact weapons fired from these launchers. 
 Training in the use of the Taser would be minimal compared to some of the other 
weapons.  It uses a familiar deployment device based upon a handgun.  Targeting is similar to 
that of a normal handgun as well, relating to targeting “center mass.”  Taking the weapon from 
holster to targeting is the same as a standard officer’s handgun.  The familiarity of the weapon 
will assist the officer in the proper deployment in a time of hurried response.  Training that 
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would be less handgun oriented would be in the area of policy restrictions.  There are also some 
departments that require the officer to feel the effects of the Taser.  This training is obviously 
less pleasant and still controversial within the law enforcement community.  Training can 
become costly at $17 per round. 
 Force on force and hand held impact weapons should require recurring training.  
Techniques are learned and easily lost if not practiced.  Techniques are not used in the “heat of 
the moment” unless they become a part of the officers regular training routine.  The cost of 
training is minimal.  The cost associated with handheld chemical agents is also minimal.  There 
is an inert training canister that could be used for targeting drills.  Some departments still require 
an officer to be sprayed with real chemical agent to experience the effects.  This training is also 
unpleasant, occasionally causes eye injury and is often the center of debate within the law 
enforcement community.  Munitions utilizing the shotgun or launchers should require regular 
qualifications beyond the initial training.  Each is capable of major injuries if targeting is less 
than accurate.  Again, training and qualifications can become quite costly. 
 The capture net is the most difficult to offer training.  Although the deployment of the net 
can easily be trained and mastered, the response after deployment is more difficult.  It is difficult 
to simulate a highly combative suspect without risk of injury to officers or role player.  The cost 
per round would make many scenarios using the capture net cost prohibitive. 
 Force on force, handheld chemical and impact weapons remain the least expensive to 
train.  However, training on force on force and impact weapons should be part of a regular, 
frequent training scenario to be effective.  Shotgun and launched munitions should require 
recurring qualifications to lessen the likelihood of injury from a missed target.  The Taser is the 
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easiest new technique to train as it follows basic handgun curriculum that modern day law 
enforcement officers are familiar.   
 Finally, the issue of controversy regarding the Taser was addressed.  There is so much 
public debate and media against the Taser that it is often difficult for a Department head to 
become a part of the attention.  Like most of the traditional less lethal weapons, the Taser’s 
controversy often stems from abuse at the hands of law enforcement.  The technology seems to 
be sound.  The problems may lie in the implementation of the technology.  Even today, the more 
traditional less lethal devices are the topic of public debate when the use results in the death or 
severe injury to a citizen.  This can and does occur even if the death is ultimately linked to some 
other cause such as a previous medical condition or drug overdose.  Granted, some of the 
controversy surrounding Taser is associated with the operation of the company instead of the 
technology.  However, anything that keeps the Taser in the news will just add to the uncertainty 
of the citizens and ultimately the Departments wishing to introduce the technology in their 
respective jurisdiction.  With this information, the Taser does appear to be a viable and valuable 
alternative to the more traditional less lethal weapons. 
 The last part of the question had to do with the preference of tactical teams to use the 
Taser of the other less lethal devices.  To address this question the results of the surveys are 
reviewed.  By far, the vast majority of the respondents have tactical teams.  In fact, 93% have a 
tactical team of some size.  A very strong 75% of the tactical teams are using currently using the 
Taser as one of their less lethal weapons.  In fact, more than half listed the Taser as their primary 
less lethal device. 
 When asked about any delay in the acceptance of the device, most sited the cost rather 
than the controversy being the factor.  However, over 70% of the respondents stated that the 
 25
advantage achieved from the use of the Taser was worth the cost associated.  One response stated 
that they had found bean bags to be ineffective.  They borrowed a Taser from a neighboring 
agency and were pleased with the result.  Another respondent stated that nothing works 100% of 
the time, but the Taser is close.  A third reported; The Taser is more effective in close quarters 
and is less cumbersome.  It is obvious from the results of the survey and added responses that the 
Taser is a preferred less lethal weapon by tactical teams in close quarter combat situations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Should the Taser be considered a viable alternative to other more traditional or perceived 
more traditional less lethal weapons during close quarter combat?  Is the Taser more effective?  
Is the Taser a better value?  These are the questions that a tactical team commander must decide 
before committing time and expense to add another device to the team’s inventory.  If the 
equipment does not add to the team’s efficiency it will not be worth the investment.  If the 
equipment is cost prohibitive to utilize or train properly, it will not be an asset. 
 It is believed that the Taser is worth the cost associated with purchase, training and 
implementation.  It is believed that tactical teams that have implemented the device agree that the 
investment was worth the cost.  It is further believed that the Taser is becoming a preferred 
alternative to the more traditional less lethal weapons.  The findings were based on two forms of 
research.  The first was a comparison of the Taser to the more traditional weaponry.  It was 
found that on most levels the Taser was the preferred technology.  The Taser was shown to be 
the most reliable.  It was the easiest new technology to teach and learn.  It was in line with 
several other traditional weapons in cost associated with supply and training.  It was also shown 
that the controversy surrounding the Taser is not unlike other traditional less lethal weapons.  
Much of the controversy centers on the abuse of the technology rather than the technology itself. 
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 The second area of research was a survey of Tactical Teams?  It was discovered that the 
majority of the respondents were already using Tasers on their Tactical Teams.  In fact, it is 
being used by 75% of the Teams that responded and was the preferred less lethal device in 76% 
of those.  These findings do support the hypothesis that the Taser is a viable, valuable and 
preferred alternative to more traditional less lethal weapons when used by Tactical Teams in 
close quarter battle.  Again, these findings were based upon a survey that was sent to 1200 
members of the FBI National Academy Association.  There were only 73 respondents to the 
survey.  The findings are from those 73 respondents.  This was after two separate requests 
requesting such information. 
 Ideally, this study will assist tactical team commanders in providing support for the 
introduction of the Taser into their arsenal of less lethal weapons.  As controversy surrounding 
the Taser mounts, it can still be shown to be a reliable alternative that should reduce both officer 
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The Taser as it Compares to Traditional Less-Lethal Weapons in 
Tactical Team Situations 
 
1. How many sworn Officers in your agency? 
 1-50  51-150  151 or more 
 
2. Are Tasers issued to your regular Patrol (non-tactical team) units? 
 Supervisors only  Supervisors & Officers  Not issued to Patrol 
 
3. How many Officers are on your tactical team? 
 1-10  11-20  21 or more  No tactical team 
 
4. How many Officers on your tactical team have been trained to utilize the Taser? 
 0  1-10  11-20  21 or more 
 
5. What less-lethal devices does your tactical team possess, train and are truly 
prepared to utilize?  (check all that apply) 
 Taser  Baton/other impact  36/40 mm sponge, wood, etc. rounds 
 Chemical Spray  Pepper Ball rounds  12 ga. Beanbag  
 Capture Net  Other:  
 
6. Is the Taser considered a primary less-lethal device for your tactical team? 
 Yes  No 
 
7. Is the Taser regularly deployed with the tactical team? 
 Yes  Only in certain instances  No 
 
8. Has your tactical team used the Taser in an actual incident (other than training)?  
If so, what were the results? 
 Yes-favorable  Yes-unfavorable  Yes-mixed results  Not used 
 
9. Has your tactical team used the Taser in an actual incident (other than training) 
where a traditional less-lethal device would have been used prior to the 
deployment of the Taser?  If so, what were the results as compared to what would 
have been expected with the traditional less-lethal device? 




10. Was there a delay in acceptance and distribution of the Taser by your tactical 
team and/or administration?  Why?  (check all that apply)  
 Cost   Controversy surrounding it  Not enough documentation 
 Content with traditional devices  Concern of training / being shocked 




11. If your tactical team is using the Taser, do you believe the benefit to your team to 
be worth the costs associated with purchasing, implementation and training? 
 Yes  No  Not using Tasers 
 
12. Please provide any other thoughts or comments on how the Taser compares to 




13. Name:  Position:  
Agency:  
 
 
 
  
